Executive Summary

Ecuador has undergone a dramatic security deterioration that has transformed the country from one of Latin America's relatively peaceful nations into a frontline state in the hemispheric narcotics conflict. The convergence of Mexican cartel operations — primarily the Sinaloa Cartel and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) — with local criminal organizations and Colombian trafficking networks has produced an explosion of violence that has fundamentally altered the country's security landscape. The national homicide rate, which stood at approximately 6 per 100,000 in 2018, surged past 45 per 100,000 by 2024, with the coastal province of Guayas and its capital Guayaquil bearing the heaviest burden.

President Daniel Noboa, who assumed office in late 2023 on an emergency mandate following the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, has pursued an aggressive militarized response. The declaration of an internal armed conflict in January 2024 authorized the deployment of the armed forces in a domestic security role, including the classification of over 20 criminal organizations as terrorist entities and belligerent actors. Military operations in prisons, ports, and urban gang strongholds have produced tactical successes — including the recapture of prison facilities and the disruption of several trafficking cells — but the strategic situation remains grave. Cartels have demonstrated the capacity to adapt, shifting routes and corrupting new networks of officials and security personnel.

The epicenter of the crisis is the competition for control of Pacific cocaine transit routes. Ecuador's ports, particularly Guayaquil and the smaller facilities at Esmeraldas and Manta, have become primary departure points for cocaine shipments destined for the United States and Europe. The country's dollarized economy and porous borders with Colombia and Peru create conditions highly favorable to money laundering and logistics operations. Prison massacres — which claimed over 400 lives between 2021 and 2025 — reflect the war between rival groups for control of incarceration facilities that serve as command-and-control centers for external operations.

Key Developments

Political

President Noboa maintains relatively strong public approval ratings, buoyed by his decisive security posture and youthful public image. However, his political coalition in the National Assembly is fragile, and he faces resistance from both the Correista opposition and civil society organizations concerned about the human rights implications of the militarized approach. The state of exception has been renewed multiple times, and there are legitimate concerns about the normalization of emergency governance and the erosion of civil liberties protections. Noboa faces a full-term presidential election in 2025, and the security situation will be the dominant electoral issue. Corruption within the judiciary and law enforcement remains a structural impediment to sustainable security gains.

Security

Ecuador's security forces are engaged in what amounts to a low-intensity conflict across multiple fronts. In Guayaquil, military and police operations have targeted gang strongholds in the southern districts, but territorial control remains contested. Car bombings, targeted assassinations of prosecutors and local officials, and attacks on critical infrastructure — including electrical transmission towers — have demonstrated the criminal organizations' capacity for strategic disruption. The prison system remains a critical vulnerability, with facilities functioning as operational headquarters for gangs. Ecuador has received military assistance from the United States, Israel, and Colombia, including intelligence-sharing agreements and training for special operations units. The navy has intensified port security operations, resulting in significant cocaine seizures, but the volume of traffic far exceeds interdiction capacity.

Economic

The security crisis has imposed significant economic costs. Foreign direct investment has declined as multinational firms reassess their risk exposure in Ecuador. The tourism sector, particularly in coastal areas, has suffered, though the Galapagos Islands remain largely insulated. Ecuador's dollarized economy provides macroeconomic stability but limits monetary policy flexibility. Oil production — the country's primary export — faces operational disruptions from pipeline attacks and extortion of energy sector contractors. The government has secured IMF financing to support fiscal stability, but the fiscal space for both security spending and social programs is severely constrained. Unemployment and underemployment, particularly among youth in urban coastal areas, provide a steady recruitment pool for criminal organizations.

Regional

Ecuador's crisis has regional dimensions that require coordinated response. Colombia has increased military deployments along the shared border, and bilateral intelligence cooperation has improved under President Petro's government, despite ideological differences. Peru faces similar cartel penetration dynamics along its northern border. The United States has provided significant security assistance, including Coast Guard cooperation for maritime interdiction, DEA operational support, and military equipment transfers. Ecuador has sought to position itself as a responsible partner in the hemispheric counter-narcotics framework, but the scale of the threat exceeds national capacity. The Pacific cocaine route now rivals the Caribbean corridor in volume, reflecting a structural shift in hemispheric trafficking patterns.

Outlook

The outlook for Ecuador is negative in the near term, with the security situation likely to remain at HIGH threat levels through the assessment period. While the Noboa government's decisive posture has produced tactical gains, the structural drivers of the crisis — demand for cocaine in consuming markets, the profitability of trafficking, institutional corruption, and socioeconomic inequality — remain unaddressed. The risk of escalation is significant, particularly if cartel organizations conduct mass-casualty attacks targeting civilian infrastructure or government institutions. Ecuador's trajectory will depend heavily on sustained international security cooperation, institutional reform in the justice and prison systems, and the government's ability to maintain public legitimacy while employing emergency security measures. A return to pre-2020 security conditions is not achievable in the medium term.

Sources

• International Crisis Group, Ecuador's Agony: Cartels, Violence, and the State, Report No. 356
• InSight Crime, Ecuador Organized Crime Profile, Updated May 2026
• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2026: Pacific Cocaine Routes
• US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Ecuador, March 2026
• Human Rights Watch, Ecuador: Military Operations and Human Rights Concerns, 2026
• IMF, Ecuador: Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation, February 2026