Gang Territorial Control

The Viv Ansanm coalition, formed in February 2024 when Jimmy Cherizier's Revolutionary Forces of the G9 and Allies merged with the G-Pep alliance, maintains control of nearly all of Port-au-Prince and has expanded operations into neighboring departments. The alliance has severed major road connections between the capital and the rest of the country and previously mounted direct attacks on Toussaint Louverture International Airport. Cherizier, a former police officer carrying a US$5 million State Department bounty, remains a fugitive believed to be operating within Haiti. He was indicted by the US Department of Justice for conspiracy to violate sanctions.

The United States has designated both Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, reflecting the severity of the threat posed by organized armed groups. Gangs continue a scorched-earth campaign characterized by indiscriminate killings, mass sexual violence deployed as a weapon of territorial control, systematic kidnapping-for-ransom, looting of commercial districts, and targeted attacks on schools, hospitals, and public infrastructure. In May 2026, fresh gang clashes displaced hundreds of additional families and forced the suspension of medical services in affected areas of the capital.

MSS-to-GSF Mission Transition

The Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission concluded its drawdown in March 2026, with the final 215 Kenyan police officers departing on 17 March. Kenya had scaled to approximately 730 officers across four contingents before executing its phased withdrawal — well below the force levels required for meaningful impact in Port-au-Prince's urban terrain.

The successor Gang Suppression Force (GSF), authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2793 (October 2025), carries a mandate to "neutralize" gangs, protect vulnerable populations, and facilitate humanitarian access. The first GSF troops — 400 Chadian soldiers — arrived 1 April 2026. As of mid-May, approximately 800 personnel have deployed, including contingents from Chad, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Major General Erdenebat Batsuuri arrived 14 May as GSF force commander, with Jack Christofides (South Africa) serving as special representative.

Chad is the largest contributor, pledging 1,500 total personnel by June. The GSF is authorized for 5,500 and targets full operational strength by October 2026. It operates independently of the Haitian National Police from the Vertières military base. The force's ability to project power beyond current defensive perimeters will be the critical test of whether this intervention succeeds where the MSS failed.

Political Transition

The Transitional Presidential Council's mandate expired on 7 February 2026 without fulfilling its core objectives. In a chaotic final week, five of nine council members voted to remove Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, placing them at odds with the US government. Fils-Aimé survived and became sole executive authority under the "National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections," signed by political parties and civil society organizations. He installed an 18-member cabinet on 4 March.

General elections are nominally scheduled for 30 August (first round) and 6 December 2026, but on 11 May, Fils-Aimé declared August elections "impossible" given security conditions, stating he aims for elections by year-end with a new president installed by February 2027. The electoral process was further disrupted after the government rejected the Provisional Electoral Council's proposed budget. A record 282 political parties registered to contest elections by the 20 March deadline — a figure that reflects political fragmentation rather than democratic vitality. Haiti has not held elections since 2016, and the democratic deficit deepens with each passing year.

Humanitarian Catastrophe

An estimated 6.4 million people — over half of Haiti's population — require emergency humanitarian assistance in 2026, up from 6 million in 2025. Food insecurity affects 5.7 million persons, with nearly 2 million at IPC emergency levels (Phase 3+) and pockets of famine-like conditions (IPC Phase 5) in gang-controlled neighborhoods of Cité Soleil and Martissant.

Internal displacement has surged to approximately 1.4 million persons, doubling in one year, with 200,000 living in overcrowded, underfunded displacement sites in the capital. Cholera cases spiked in 2025, reversing the prior downward trend, with 2,852 suspected cases reported by October 2025. The 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan seeks US$880 million to assist 4.2 million people. Healthcare access continues to deteriorate as gang violence forces closures of medical facilities, with Médecins Sans Frontières operating as the primary provider of emergency medical services in the capital.

Regional Spillover

The Dominican Republic continues construction of a 164 km border wall (3.9 meters high, equipped with fiber optics, sensors, and cameras). Mass deportations of Haitian migrants continue, with an estimated 458,000+ irregular Haitian migrants residing in the DR. US Coast Guard data indicates Dominican deportation spikes precede maritime departure surges by 2–3 weeks, as Haitians attempt dangerous sea crossings toward the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Florida. CARICOM members have expressed concern that fortress-like border approaches may proliferate regionally.

International Response

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2814 (2026) renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti. The arms embargo was expanded in October 2024 to cover all arms types, in force until 17 October 2026. The US imposed visa restrictions on two Transitional Presidential Council members and a cabinet minister in January 2026, and arrested two businessmen accused of supporting criminal groups. Canada and the EU each sanctioned three additional individuals for undermining stability.

Outlook

The outlook for Haiti is dire and deteriorating. The GSF represents a meaningful improvement over the MSS in terms of mandate authority and troop composition, but at 800 of 5,500 authorized personnel, it lacks the mass to alter the security trajectory in Port-au-Prince. Achieving full operational capability by October 2026 is essential but not guaranteed. Elections in 2026 remain improbable given current conditions. The humanitarian crisis will deepen through the hurricane season. State failure is not a future risk — it is the present reality. The international community's response remains dangerously insufficient relative to the scale of the catastrophe.

Sources

• International Crisis Group, Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance, Report No. 110
• UN Security Council, Resolution 2793 (2025) — Gang Suppression Force Authorization
• UN Security Council, Resolution 2814 (2026) — BINUH Mandate Renewal
• OCHA, Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
• IPC Global Initiative, Haiti Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, 2026
• Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Haiti
• CSIS, Haiti Embarks on Another Rocky Political Transition, 2026
• US Department of Justice, Cherizier Indictment for Sanctions Violations