SafePay

Ransomware and extortion · Origin not attributed
0
APAC targets
0
Techniques
1
Incidents
0
News · 30d
Profile
Type: Ransomware and extortion · Curated list of ransomware brands (aggregator.actor_catalogue)

SafePay ransomware started in October 2024 as a new ransomware service, using some of the leaked LockBit source code. Soon after launching, the group made a big impact in the ransomware world, hacking at least 33 organizations by December 9.

The first version of SafePay was created by modifying the LockBit source code. It adds the ".safepay" extension to files that it encrypts and includes a ransom note called "readme_safepay.txt." This version uses a three-step XOR method with a random single-byte key, making it hard for security researchers to analyse.

The group's technical infrastructure includes both a dark web blog and a presence on the TON network for victim communications. Their attack methodology follows a double extortion model, combining traditional file encryption with data theft to maximise pressure on victims. SafePay operators typically move from initial access to ransomware deployment in under 24 hours, significantly faster than the industry average. . Among the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of the SafePay group, notable characteristics include the use of compromised VPN credentials as an initial access vector, extensive use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and sophisticated privilege escalation techniques. The group frequently employs ShareFinder.ps1 for network reconnaissance and uses WinRAR for data archival before exfiltration. Post encryption, SafePay directs victims to their negotiation portal accessible through both Tor and TON networks.

The group has demonstrated sophisticated operational security measures, including a Cyrillic-language-based killswitch that prevents execution in eastern European countries.

Related profiles: LockBit

Profiles whose description names this actor, that this description names, or that share one of its names. The sources mention them together; they are not necessarily the same group.

ATT&CK techniques
MITRE ATT&CK has no technique mapping for this actor.
Malware and tools
MITRE ATT&CK documents no software for this actor.

Software that MITRE ATT&CK documents this group using, or the brand's own ransomware. Many groups share tools such as Mimikatz or PsExec: the same tool does not link two groups.

Activity in the news · last 12 months
Asia-Pacific coverageOther news
Figures
MonthAsia-PacificOther newsCyber stories, Asia-PacificCyber stories, all
Dec 202500244247
Jan 202600138140
Feb 202600144157
Mar 202600228241
Apr 202600312327
May 202600297314
Jun 202600296387
Jul 202600310337
Aug 202600270301
Sep 202600350479
Oct 202601579831
Nov 20260012742071

News stories that name it (one story told by several outlets counts once). The site has read the international cyber press since 8 November 2026 and more of the region's cyber press since 9–15 November, so earlier months count fewer stories for every actor: read a month against the cyber stories of that month (Figures).

Incidents attributed
Targets
No victim countries in the sources.
Vulnerabilities
ATT&CK cites no CVE for this actor and no article about it alone names one.

KEV: in CISA's catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities. The news counts an article only when it names this actor alone and at most 5 CVEs; being named together does not prove exploitation.

Relevance to the EU
EU relevance: Low
No EU member state among its known victims and no overlap with EU projects
No EU cooperation projects recorded in its target countries.
References
Profile from: MISP ransomware galaxy