COBALT KATANA has been active since at least March 2018, and it focuses many of its operations on organizations based in or associated with Kuwait. The group has targeted government, logistics, and shipping organizations. The threat actors gain initial access to targets using DNS hijacking, strategic web compromise with SMB forced authentication, and password brute force attacks. COBALT KATANA operates a custom platform referred to as the Sakabota Framework, also referred to as Sakabota Core, with a complimentary set of modular backdoors and accessory tools including Gon, Hisoka, Hisoka Netero, Killua, Diezen, and Eye. The group has implemented DNS tunnelling in its malware and malicious scripts and also operates the HyphenShell web shell to strengthen post-intrusion access. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that COBALT KATANA operates on behalf of Iran, and elements of its operations such as overlapping infrastructure, use of DNS hijacking, implementation of DNS-based C2 channels in malware and web shell security mechanisms suggest connections to COBALT GYPSY and COBALT EDGEWATER.
Profiles whose description names this actor, that this description names, or that share one of its names. The sources mention them together; they are not necessarily the same group.
Software that MITRE ATT&CK documents this group using. Many groups share tools such as Mimikatz or PsExec: the same tool does not link two groups.
- No incident in the register is attributed to this actor.
KEV: in CISA's catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities. The news counts an article only when it names this actor alone and at most 5 CVEs; being named together does not prove exploitation.