Myanmar Security Report — June 25, 2026

Security analysis based on open-source intelligence and web research. Period: June 18 — June 25, 2026.

Executive Summary

Myanmar's security landscape from June 18 to June 25, 2026, was characterized by intensified military offensives by the junta, particularly along critical trade routes in Sagaing Region and in Rakhine State, leading to significant civilian casualties from widespread airstrikes. Diplomatic efforts saw the junta leader engage with both China and India, seeking legitimacy and economic cooperation amidst international isolation. Concurrently, ethnic armed organizations, notably the Arakan Army, demonstrated increasing military capabilities and territorial control, further fragmenting the country's internal power dynamics. The ongoing conflict continues to exacerbate a severe humanitarian crisis, compounded by a decline in international aid and persistent transnational criminal activities along border regions.

Key Security Developments

• Military Offensive to Reclaim Trade Routes in Sagaing Region
  The Myanmar military announced on June 24, 2026, a major offensive to regain control of the Kalewa-Yagyi-Monywa road, a crucial artery for the India-Myanmar trade route project in Sagaing Region. This offensive, which began on June 2, has resulted in the recapture of several villages, including Lar Po on June 18, Sit Lin Chaung on June 21, and Hton Gyi on June 22. The military claims to have seized People's Defence Force (PDF) camps, weapons, and ammunition, forcing the PDFs to retreat from the route. The significance lies in the junta's efforts to secure vital economic corridors and assert control over areas previously held by resistance forces, which had reportedly engaged in extortion and illegal activities along these routes.

• Escalating Airstrikes and Civilian Casualties in Rakhine and Mon States
  The Myanmar military conducted airstrikes on Maungdaw and Gwa townships in Rakhine State on June 23 and 24, injuring six people, including two schoolgirls aged 18 and 19 in Maungdaw, and killing a 55-year-old and injuring three others in Gwa. These attacks also destroyed houses and an ambulance. Separately, on June 18, an airstrike in Kyaikto Township, Mon State, without local battles, reportedly killed two civilians and injured one. These incidents underscore the junta's increasing reliance on air power, including the use of gyrocopters and paramotors, which have seen a significant surge in attacks since 2025, causing widespread civilian deaths and displacement.

• Arakan Army Halts Junta Advance in Bago Region
  On June 24, 2026, Arakan Army (AA) forces and allied resistance groups ambushed and forced a Myanmar military junta offensive column to withdraw in Padaung Township, Bago Region. The junta troops had advanced towards Nyaungkyoe Village, attempting to breach resistance positions along the Arakan-Bago border area. This event highlights the growing operational capabilities of the AA and its allies, which have been extending operations into Bago, Magway, and Ayeyarwady regions and are increasingly functioning as a de facto government in western Myanmar.

• Military Buildup in Kyainseikgyi, Karen State
  Military junta troop movements have been increasing in Kyainseikgyi Township, Karen State, with continuous arrivals from Mawlamyine, Mudon, and Ye townships. Residents reported increased military presence in Kyainseikgyi town and along major transportation routes. Analysts suggest this buildup may indicate preparations for military operations targeting Payathonzu, a strategically important Thai-Myanmar border area that the junta previously lost. This development signals potential for renewed large-scale conflict in the region, despite challenges posed by the rainy season.

• Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Issues Warning in Shwegu District
  On June 23, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Battalion 12 issued a directive to residents and business owners in Shwegu District, Kachin State, to cease all association with the military junta. The warning specifically prohibits collaboration with the regime in gold and mineral mining businesses and forbids providing intelligence. The KIA stated that decisive action would be taken against non-compliance. This directive reflects the ongoing struggle for control and influence between ethnic armed organizations and the junta in resource-rich border areas.

• President Min Aung Hlaing's State Visit to China
  Myanmar President U Min Aung Hlaing paid a state visit to China from June 15 to 19, 2026, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. During the visit, 18 agreements and memoranda of understanding were signed, including one on cooperation to jointly advance the Global Security Initiative (GSI). China reiterated its support for Myanmar's new government in coordinating development and security and pledged to combat cross-border crime, including online gambling and telecom fraud, which have become a major concern for Beijing. This visit underscores China's role as a crucial economic and diplomatic lifeline for the isolated Myanmar regime.

• Diplomatic Discussions with India Precede Border Offensives
  Prior to his visit to China, President Min Aung Hlaing visited India from May 30 to June 3, 2026, meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other Indian officials. Discussions covered trade, border stability, and security matters. India reaffirmed its readiness to support peace and dialogue in Myanmar. This diplomatic engagement with India preceded the Myanmar military's offensive to regain control of the Kalewa-Yagyi-Monywa and Tamu-Kalay-Khampat trade routes, which are vital for India-Myanmar trade.

• ASEAN's Evolving Engagement with Naypyidaw
  A significant shift is underway in ASEAN's approach to Myanmar, with several member states, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Laos, engaging bilaterally with Naypyidaw. This suggests a reconsideration of the collective pressure approach adopted since the 2021 coup, with some foreign ministers open to including a virtual seat for Myanmar's new government in upcoming talks. This move risks giving the junta greater diplomatic flexibility and potentially undermining a coordinated regional strategy for a political settlement.

• Deepening Humanitarian Crisis Amidst Declining Aid
  A UN human rights office report published on June 22, 2026, highlighted that a drop in humanitarian assistance is worsening the suffering of millions in Myanmar after five years of conflict. The report noted that foreign actors continue to transfer arms, parts, ammunition, and jet fuel to the military, risking facilitation of human rights and humanitarian law violations. At least 702 civilian deaths were verified between August 2025 and January 2026, with 476 due to airstrikes.

• Transnational Crime and Border Security Concerns
  More than 5,300 people remain trapped in online scam centers near the Thai border, despite a multinational crackdown, according to a human rights group on June 23, 2026. These centers, often staffed by human trafficking victims, continue to engage in online fraud and human trafficking, harming victims globally. China has expressed growing frustration over the junta's failure to crack down on these criminal operations along their shared border.

• Myanmar Remains on FATF High-Risk Jurisdictions List
  On June 19, 2026, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reiterated Myanmar's status as a high-risk jurisdiction subject to a call for action due to strategic deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime. While Myanmar has taken some steps to improve, such as enhanced use of financial intelligence and increased confiscation of criminal proceeds, the FATF warned of potential countermeasures if no further progress is made by October 2026.

Geopolitical Impact and Regional Dynamics

Myanmar's internal conflict and the junta's actions are increasingly recognized as having significant geopolitical implications beyond its immediate borders. The country's strategic location at the intersection of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the wider Indo-Pacific means that its instability affects regional security, economic stability, and strategic competition. China's deepening engagement with Myanmar, exemplified by President Min Aung Hlaing's recent state visit, is driven by Beijing's strategic interests in securing vital economic corridors, particularly the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the Kyaukphyu port and pipeline projects. These projects offer China a bypass around the vulnerable Strait of Malacca, enhancing its energy security and Indian Ocean access. China's support, including reported deployment of drone operators to defend Kyaukphyu, indicates a more direct investment in protecting its indispensable infrastructure.

Russia is also expanding its influence within the Indo-Pacific through its relationship with Myanmar's military, with growing defense-industrial cooperation and military technology exchanges raising questions about regional security dynamics and sanctions effectiveness. Meanwhile, India, guided by its "Neighbourhood First" and "Act East" policies, views Myanmar as a critical partner for border stability and regional connectivity. The recent visit by Min Aung Hlaing to India underscored New Delhi's concerns about illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and weapon smuggling emanating from the fragmented India-Myanmar border, which is increasingly controlled by ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy actors. India's efforts to reopen trade routes like Kalay-Tamu and Kalewa-Yagyi-Monywa are directly linked to its economic and security interests in the region.

Within ASEAN, a notable shift is occurring, with some member states moving towards bilateral engagement with the Naypyidaw regime, potentially diluting the bloc's collective pressure strategy. This "forum shopping" by the junta allows it to gain regional acceptance incrementally without making significant progress on the Five-Point Consensus. This fragmented diplomatic approach risks empowering the junta and undermining efforts to achieve a political settlement, further complicating regional stability and the international community's ability to address the crisis effectively.

Military and Defense Analysis

The Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, is engaged in a brutal civil war across multiple fronts, characterized by a significant reliance on air power to counter widespread resistance. Open-source tracking indicates a sharp increase in junta air and drone strikes, rising from 134 in the first year after the 2021 coup to over 3,300 across 2025-2026, resulting in over 3,800 civilian deaths from airstrikes alone. The military has expanded its air assets to include easily available gyrocopters and paramotors for nighttime bombings, particularly in opposition-held territories, highlighting a strategy to strike areas beyond the reach of its ground troops. This heavy reliance on aerial operations often underscores ground weaknesses, as late-stage counterinsurgencies frequently appear strongest from the air when they are weakest on the ground.

Despite earlier battlefield losses, the military has regained some momentum, aided by an unpopular conscription drive and critical support from China. Recent offensives, such as the one to regain control of the Kalewa-Yagyi-Monywa road in Sagaing Region, demonstrate the junta's focus on re-establishing control over strategic trade and transportation corridors. However, the conflict remains highly fragmented, with control flipping by district and resistance forces and ethnic armies holding an estimated 42% of the territory. The growing capabilities of ethnic armed organizations, particularly the Arakan Army, which now exercises effective territorial control and administration in much of Rakhine State, present a significant challenge to the Tatmadaw's overall force posture. The military's attempts to regain lost border areas, such as Payathonzu in Karen State, indicate ongoing efforts to consolidate control and secure alternative trade routes.

Outlook and Forecast

Short-term trends (1-3 months): The intensity of the civil war in Myanmar is expected to remain elevated, with continued and potentially expanded junta air and drone operations against populated areas, particularly in Shan, Sagaing, Mandalay, and Rakhine regions. Resistance forces, including PDFs and ethnic armed organizations, will likely maintain their offensives and defensive postures, leading to persistent clashes. Diplomatic maneuvering by the junta to gain legitimacy and secure economic lifelines from countries like China and India will continue, while ASEAN's shift towards bilateral engagement may further complicate a unified international response. The humanitarian crisis is projected to worsen due to ongoing violence, displacement, and the compounding effects of reduced international aid and the monsoon season.

Critical flashpoints and risk areas: Several regions are poised to remain critical flashpoints. Sagaing Region, particularly along the Kalewa-Yagyi-Monywa and Tamu-Kalay-Khampat trade routes, will see continued heavy fighting as the junta attempts to consolidate control over these vital corridors. Rakhine State will remain highly volatile, with the Arakan Army's advances towards strategically important areas like Kyaukphyu, which hosts China's significant port and pipeline projects, posing a direct challenge to the junta and raising concerns for Chinese interests. Karen State, specifically around Kyainseikgyi and Payathonzu, is at risk of escalating military operations as the junta seeks to regain lost border territories. Urban centers like Yangon and Mandalay will likely remain exposed to unconventional attacks and security raids.

Indicators to monitor: Key indicators to monitor include the frequency and lethality of junta airstrikes and drone attacks, which serve as a measure of the conflict's intensity and civilian impact. The effectiveness of the junta's ground offensives in securing strategic routes and recapturing lost territory will be crucial. Further shifts in diplomatic engagement by ASEAN member states and the extent of economic and military support from China and India will indicate the junta's international standing and capacity to sustain its rule. The humanitarian situation, including displacement figures and access to aid, will reflect the conflict's human cost. Additionally, developments in combating transnational crime, particularly online scam centers along the border, will be important given China's strong interest in this issue.

Strategic recommendations: International actors should prioritize coordinated efforts to address the escalating humanitarian crisis, ensuring unimpeded access for aid organizations and increasing support for local civilian protection initiatives. A unified and robust diplomatic approach from ASEAN and other international bodies is essential to prevent the junta from exploiting bilateral engagements to evade accountability and undermine efforts towards a political settlement. Pressure should be maintained on the junta to cease indiscriminate attacks on civilians and to engage in meaningful dialogue with all stakeholders. Furthermore, addressing the root causes and facilitating the dismantling of transnational criminal networks, including scam centers, requires concerted international cooperation with all relevant actors in the region, including ethnic armed organizations that control significant border territories.

Sources

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