Myanmar Security Report — February 23, 2026

Security analysis based on open-source intelligence and web research. Period: February 16 — February 23, 2026.

Executive Summary

Myanmar continues to be gripped by a severe and multifaceted security crisis, marked by escalating conflict, widespread human rights abuses, and a deepening humanitarian emergency between February 16 and February 23, 2026. The military junta, having concluded what international observers largely deemed "sham elections" in January, is consolidating its political control while intensifying military operations against resistance forces and civilian populations. Key developments include continued aerial bombardments and drone attacks by the junta, significant resistance activities, and a deepening military alliance with Russia. Diplomatic tensions have risen, notably with Timor-Leste following human rights complaints, while the humanitarian situation remains dire with millions displaced and in need of assistance. The junta's new cybersecurity laws further restrict digital freedoms, indicating a tightening grip on information and dissent.

Key Security Developments

• Intensified Junta Aerial and Ground Operations
  On February 16, the junta army conducted drone attacks using flammable bombs in Wetlet Township, Sagaing Region, reportedly setting public houses on fire. Concurrently, in Tanintharyi Township, the junta strengthened forces in Theinkun Village and burnt down over 100 houses in Lethe village, according to the Karen National Union Myeik-Dawei District. These actions highlight the military's continued reliance on destructive tactics, including aerial assets and arson, to suppress resistance and displace local populations.

• Resistance Force Engagements and Drone Warfare
  On February 16, an attack occurred on a convoy of the junta's Pyusawti Militia in Mindone Township, Magway Region, resulting in the death of a junta member. Furthermore, Kantbalu District PDF (1820) in Sagaing Region launched a "Thunder Strike" campaign to upgrade drone manufacturing technology, indicating a strategic focus on advanced asymmetric warfare. On February 14, the junta army suffered significant losses in Falam Township, Chin State, due to suicidal drone attacks by resistance forces. This demonstrates the increasing sophistication and effectiveness of resistance drone capabilities.

• Major Clashes and Territorial Control Shifts
  Heavy fighting was reported in Myawaddy Township on February 16, forcing residents of Falu and Minletpan Village to flee and seek assistance. Earlier, on February 15, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) announced the recapture of Pasawng in Kayah State, following 31 engagements and the confiscation of 17 assorted arms. This indicates ongoing, intense ground battles with both sides vying for territorial control, often resulting in significant civilian displacement.

• Junta Recapture of Banmauk Township
  In January 2026, the junta successfully recaptured Banmauk Township through sustained aerial bombardment. This development revealed critical vulnerabilities for resistance forces attempting to hold urban areas against the junta's air campaigns, underscoring the decisive role of air superiority in the conflict.

• Diplomatic Expulsion of Timor-Leste Envoy
  On February 25, 2026 (reported on Feb 16), Myanmar's military-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered Elisio do Rosario de Sousa, Timor-Leste's Chargé d'Affaires a.i., to leave the country within seven days. This expulsion was framed as a response to Timor-Leste's "blatant violation" of ASEAN principles, but it followed a criminal complaint filed in Timor-Leste on January 12, 2026, by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) and the Myanmar Accountability Project (MAP), documenting atrocities against the Chin people. This incident highlights the junta's intolerance for international efforts to hold it accountable for human rights violations.

• Deepening Military Cooperation with Russia
  In early February 2026 (reported on Feb 3-4), Myanmar and Russia signed a five-year military cooperation agreement lasting until 2030, following a visit by Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. Russia pledged "comprehensive assistance" to Myanmar, including in the international arena, reinforcing the junta's reliance on Russia for weapons, jets, and drones crucial for its ongoing civil war.

• Resistance Intelligence on Russian Arms Facilities
  Myanmar rebels have established a network to monitor the relocation of arms factories supplying the military and Russia. Their current priority is to identify where a new Russian weapons facility will be built in Myanmar, a project discussed between Naypyidaw and Moscow for months. People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and the National Unity Government (NUG) intelligence services are mobilizing human and open-source intelligence to track Russian engineers and anomalies in electricity consumption, particularly in southern Shan State, Magway region, and along the Irrawaddy banks.

• Continued Civilian Casualties from Airstrikes
  According to the Myanmar Defense & Security Institute (MDSI), there were 109 airstrikes by the junta army across the country in January, resulting in 127 civilian deaths and 241 injuries. On February 14, junta airstrikes in Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U, Rakhine State, killed 7 civilians and injured 16, as reported by the Arakan Army. These figures underscore the indiscriminate nature of the junta's aerial campaign and its devastating impact on civilians.

• Humanitarian Crisis Deepens
  A delegation from the Committee Representing Pyitaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) at the UN in New York on February 12-13 stated that over 16 million people in Myanmar are in need of humanitarian assistance and over 4 million have been displaced since the military coup. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) reported on February 17 that nearly 4 million people are internally displaced, 1.5 million have sought refuge abroad, and approximately one-third of the population requires humanitarian aid.

• Cybersecurity Law Implementation and Digital Repression
  Myanmar's Cybersecurity Law No. 1/2025, which came into effect on July 30, 2025, continues to be a tool for digital repression. The law mandates government approval for VPN services and requires licensing for digital platforms with over 100,000 users or cybersecurity providers. It also grants sweeping powers for surveillance and censorship, requiring digital platforms to store user data for up to three years. This legislation significantly curtails digital rights and freedom of expression.

• Junta's Post-Election Political Maneuvers
  Following the "sham elections" that concluded on January 25, 2026, with a predetermined victory for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the new parliament is expected to convene in March and a new government in April. On February 4, the junta leader Min Aung Hlaing signed a law authorizing the creation of a new Union Consultative Council, a body that could allow its chairman to wield influence without formally leading the new government, raising questions about his future role.

Geopolitical Impact and Regional Dynamics

Myanmar's security developments in this period continue to profoundly impact regional stability and its relations with major global powers. The deepening military alliance between Myanmar and Russia, solidified by a five-year cooperation agreement in early February 2026, signals a further entrenchment of the junta's international support base. This alliance provides the junta with crucial access to weapons, jets, and drones, enabling its continued military operations and complicating international efforts to isolate the regime. Russia's pledge of "comprehensive assistance" extends beyond military aid, offering diplomatic backing on the international stage, which could further embolden the junta against external pressure.

China's role remains pivotal, with the second junta leader Soe Win emphasizing Myanmar's strategic importance as an outlet to the Indian Ocean for China and highlighting increased Chinese investments. While China has exerted some pressure on ethnic resistance organizations, its overall stance has been seen as backing the junta, contributing to the perception that the regime has powerful allies. This dual support from Russia and China allows the junta to withstand international condemnation and sanctions, creating a fragmented international response. ASEAN, constrained by its principles of non-interference and consensus, has struggled to present a unified front. While some members like Thailand have engaged with the post-election Myanmar government, endorsing it as a "political transition" and discussing border trade and energy cooperation, others have maintained a more critical stance. This fragmentation within ASEAN allows the regime to claim divided international opinion and point to evidence of acceptance.

The expulsion of Timor-Leste's diplomat following a human rights complaint filed in Dili underscores the junta's sensitivity to international accountability efforts and its willingness to retaliate against states that challenge its narrative. This incident could deter other smaller nations from pursuing similar legal avenues, although it also highlights the growing importance of universal jurisdiction cases. The United States, through actions like the extension of the national emergency and the passage of the Brave Burma Act, continues to signal its disapproval and aims to restrict the junta's access to resources like jet fuel. However, without broader international consensus and stronger enforcement mechanisms, the impact of such measures may be limited. The ongoing humanitarian crisis, with millions displaced and in need of aid, continues to be a regional destabilizing factor, potentially leading to increased refugee flows and cross-border tensions.

Military and Defense Analysis

The Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, continues to rely heavily on its air superiority and increasingly sophisticated drone technology to conduct offensive operations and maintain control over contested areas. The January 2026 report by the Myanmar Defense and Security Institute (MDSI) noted the military's integration of drone technology to synchronize joint operations involving artillery, missiles, and ground forces in counter-offensives and urban defense scenarios. This is evident in the continued high number of airstrikes, with 109 reported in January alone, resulting in significant civilian casualties. The recapture of Banmauk Township through sustained aerial bombardment further demonstrates the effectiveness of this strategy against resistance forces.

To address chronic manpower shortages at the combat battalion level, the junta has continued its conscription program, which began in 2024 and has inducted at least 90,000 draftees. This influx of personnel, while potentially impacting the quality and experience of combat units, has provided field commanders with much-needed numbers to pursue major offensives. The establishment of new arms factories in regions like Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Shan State indicates an effort to bolster domestic defense production and reduce reliance on external suppliers, although Russia and China remain crucial sources of advanced weaponry.

Conversely, resistance forces, including the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), are also adapting their military strategies. Their increasing use of drones, including suicidal drones, as seen in Falam Township, Chin State, presents a growing threat to junta forces and infrastructure. The campaign by Kantbalu District PDF to upgrade drone manufacturing technology highlights a strategic focus on asymmetric warfare to counter the Tatmadaw's air power. However, resistance forces remain vulnerable to the junta's aerial campaigns, particularly in urban areas. The ongoing efforts by resistance intelligence networks to monitor and identify new Russian arms facilities in Myanmar underscore their awareness of the junta's foreign military support and their attempts to disrupt these supply chains.

Outlook and Forecast

Short-term trends (1-3 months): The immediate outlook for Myanmar suggests a continuation of intense armed conflict, with the military junta likely to press its advantage following the "sham elections" and renewed foreign military support. The Tatmadaw will likely continue its strategy of aerial bombardment and ground offensives to consolidate control over contested territories, particularly in Sagaing, Magway, Chin, and Shan States. Resistance forces are expected to maintain their guerrilla tactics, with an increasing emphasis on drone warfare and targeted attacks against junta personnel and infrastructure. The humanitarian crisis will almost certainly worsen, driven by continued displacement and restricted aid access. Politically, the junta will proceed with forming a new government in April, likely with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing retaining significant influence through new structures like the Union Consultative Council.

Critical flashpoints and risk areas: Key flashpoints will remain in regions where resistance is strong and the junta is attempting to reassert control, such as Sagaing, Chin, Rakhine, and Shan States. Urban areas and displacement camps are at high risk of indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery attacks. The border regions, particularly those adjacent to China and Thailand, will continue to be areas of significant activity, including cross-border trade, refugee movements, and potential for transnational organized crime. The Dawei region, where Russia has been promised concession rights for a deep-water port, could become a strategic flashpoint if resistance forces continue to challenge junta control there. The implementation of the stringent Cybersecurity Law poses a significant risk to digital freedoms and could lead to increased arrests and suppression of dissent online.

Indicators to monitor: Several indicators will be crucial to monitor. These include the effectiveness and sustainability of the junta's conscription efforts and the morale of its draftee-heavy battalions. The level of coordination and unification among the diverse resistance groups, particularly the National Unity Government (NUG) and various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), will be critical for their long-term effectiveness. The extent of military and economic support from China and Russia will continue to be a key determinant of the junta's resilience. International responses, including the enforcement of sanctions, the progress of accountability mechanisms like the ICJ and universal jurisdiction cases, and the provision of humanitarian aid, will also be vital. The economic collapse and rising transnational crime rates are important indicators of the country's overall instability.

Strategic recommendations: The international community should unequivocally reject the legitimacy of the junta's "sham elections" and continue to advocate for a return to democratic rule. Increased support for accountability mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice and universal jurisdiction cases, is essential to address war crimes and crimes against humanity. Targeted sanctions against the junta's revenue streams and its access to military hardware, particularly jet fuel, should be strengthened and rigorously enforced. Humanitarian aid to Myanmar must be significantly scaled up and delivered through all available channels, including cross-border routes, to reach the millions in need, while actively challenging the junta's obstruction of aid. Diplomatic efforts should focus on fostering greater unity within ASEAN and among global powers to develop a coherent and robust strategy to address the crisis, including engaging with the National Unity Government and ethnic revolutionary organizations. Finally, support for digital rights and efforts to circumvent the junta's cybersecurity laws are crucial to protect freedom of expression and access to information.